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Citizens in a representative democracy have the right to seek to participate in and influence the processes of government decision-making and 
policy formulation on any issue of concern to them. The importance of FOI legislation is that it provides the means for a person to have access to 
the knowledge and information that will assist a more meaningful and effective exercise of that right.1 
Freedom of information (or ‘FOI’) legislation creates a legally enforceable right for members of the public to access government information. It 
purports to promote open and accountable government, and to facilitate participative democracy. For example, the Commonwealth Freedom of 
Information Act (1982) promises ‘to give members of the public rights of access to official documents of the Government of the Commonwealth 
and of its agencies’.  
However, in practice, the Act creates a scheme where the Government can escape the application of its own laws. As the recent High Court 
decision of McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury2 (‘McKinnon’) illustrates, the Government can restrict access to documents by 
means of an ‘exemption certificate’. As long as it can point to one legitimate consideration in support of the certificate, that is enough. It need 
not consider the factors in favour of disclosure, no matter how strong they may be. 
McKinnon enlarges an already existing loophole for  
government departments wishing to avoid the application of FOI laws, potentially depriving the public of information to which they would 
otherwise be entitled.  
The moral and political arguments against the case have been aired extensively in the media following the McKinnon decision. In this article, I 
suggest the legal reasoning of majority joint judgment in McKinnon can also be criticised. The reasoning of the majority in McKinnon turned on 
a question of statutory interpretation. This article argues that the majority judges Callinan and Heydon JJ were not bound to interpret the 
legislation in such a way as to enlarge the loophole. Their judgment could have placed greater weight on the objects of the legislation, and the 
right to freedom of political communication that is implicit in the Constitution. 
The McKinnon case 
Mr McKinnon, an editor of The Australian newspaper, requested information from the Department of Treasury regarding tax bracket creep and 
the government’s first home owners’ scheme. The Department of Treasury responded with an ‘exemption certificate’ issued under s 36 of the 
FOI Act. Before he could issue the certificate, the Treasurer had to be satisfied that the document: 
(a) contained matter in the nature of, or relating to, opinion, advice or recommendation obtained, prepared or recorded or deliberation that has taken place, in the 
course of deliberative process involving an agency or Minister; and 
(b) disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. 
McKinnon responded by taking his case to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the ‘AAT’), which he was entitled to do under s 58(5) of the 
FOI Act. The AAT is empowered by that section only to ‘determine the question whether there exists reasonable grounds for the claim that the 
disclosure of the document would be contrary to the public interest.’ McKinnon argued that the public interest in understanding the 
Government’s intentions and options with respect to important economic policies far outweighed any potential confusion that might be caused 
by the complexity and provisional nature of the documents. 
By contrast, the government argued that it had valid reasons for issuing the exemption certificate. Section 58(5) did not empower the AAT to 
take into account the factors in favour of disclosure. The AAT was only entitled to examine the government’s claim that disclosure was not in 
the public interest and determine whether the reasons advanced to prevent disclosure were valid — not to weigh their merits against factors in 
favour of disclosure. 
The government claimed the documents were drafts that included options not settled at the time of drafting, and that these might be mistaken for 
a final position. The thrust of their submission was that to release such ‘working documents’ would compromise the necessary confidentiality of 
the public sector, ‘threatening the Westminster-based system of government’.  
By a 3:2 majority, the High Court found that the AAT had correctly decided the matter, and there was no legal basis for disputing the exemption 
certificate had been issued on reasonable grounds. 
The crucial question was whether s 58(5) empowers the AAT to determine the factors for and against disclosure and therefore decide on balance 
whether the certificate was issued on ‘reasonable grounds’? Alternatively, does the wording of the section limit the AAT to examining the reasons 
for the government’s claim that disclosure is not in the public interest and determining whether those claims have any reasonable factual basis? 
The majority joint judgment 
The joint judgment of Callinan and Heydon JJ concluded that, so long as there was one reasonable ground to support the government’s claim 
that disclosure would not be in the public interest, the conclusiveness of the certificate would be beyond administrative or judicial review. In 
reaching this conclusion, the joint judges acknowledged that their approach may lead to the ‘practical consequence … that one or more of the 
stated objects of the Act are thereby defeated’.3 Nevertheless, they argued that the wording of the legislation provided for no more, and the 
language of the statute should not be paraphrased into another test.  
Callinan and Heydon JJ accepted Treasury’s argument that disclosure might jeopardise candour and discourage written communication within 
government was reasonable. They accepted that documents prepared to respond to questions in Parliament should remain confidential ‘because 
their exposure would threaten the Westminster system of government, that is to say responsible government’. They also accepted that the 
documents protected by the certificate were interim in nature, involving some recommendations that were not adopted, and they concluded it 
would be difficult to see how it would not be reasonable for a minister to take the view that the release of material of that kind would not make a 
valuable contribution to public debate. 
The minority joint judgment 
Gleeson CJ and Kirby J delivered a joint judgment that displayed considerable concern at limiting administrative and judicial review of FOI to 
this extent. Following the argument through to its practical conclusion, they observed it would mean that: 
[S]o long as there is anything relevant to be said in support of the view that disclosure would be contrary to the public interest, an applicant for review under s 
58(5) must fail. We cannot accept that. … [T]he preservation of confidentiality of intra-governmental communications prior to making a decision could always 
be advanced, in the case of internal working documents of the kind with which we are concerned, as a relevant consideration. How could that facet of the public 
interest ever be served by disclosure? How, then, could an applicant ever succeed? 
The minority joint judgment stated that the public interest was a multi-faceted concept. The Tribunal was required to take into account all relevant 
considerations, including those in favour of disclosure, in order to determine whether reasonable grounds existed. 
The judgment then went even further and found that facilitating disclosure of information was the principal object of the Act, and what was a 
reasonable decision had to be evaluated in that context: 
Under the FOI Act, however, the matter of disclosure or non-disclosure is not approached on the basis that there are empty scales in equilibrium, waiting for 
arguments to be put on one side or the other. There is a ‘general right of access to information ... limited only by exceptions and exemptions necessary for the 
protection of essential public interests [and other matters not presently material]’ … That is the context in which the question of reasonableness raised by s 58(5) 
is to be addressed. To lose sight of that would be to lose sight of the principal object of the FOI Act.
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The judgment of Hayne J 
Hayne J delivered a separate majority judgment that upheld the validity of the exemption certificate. However, in contrast to the majority joint 
judgment, Hayne J stated: 
the Tribunal’s task is to decide whether the conclusion expressed in the certificate (that disclosure of particular documents would be contrary to the public 
interest) can be supported by logical arguments which, taken together, are reasonably open to be adopted and which, if adopted, would support the conclusion 
expressed in the certificate. The focus of the Tribunal must be upon the grounds for the conclusion. Are those grounds ‘ reasonable grounds’? 
Nevertheless, on the evidence before him, Hayne J found that an examination of the AAT proceedings pointed to the conclusion that, in this 
case, all logical arguments had been taken into account and reasonable grounds had been properly established.  
Analysis of McKinnon 
The damaging practical effect of the majority joint judgment in McKinnon is that it strips reviewing bodies of any real power to provide 
applicants with access to government information. As the minority point out, confidentiality of governmental deliberations is always arguably a 
reasonable consideration. If this reason can be blandly asserted each time a minister does not find it convenient for information to be disclosed, 
freedom of information legislation is effectively undermined.  
The result is a ministerial discretion with no real checks and balances, leaving it open to be exercised in an inappropriate way. The courts have fought 
to impose restraints on the exercise of what might appear to be very broad ministerial discretions in other contexts, and have held firm against attempts 
by the legislature to intrude on judicial review of executive action.5 The principle of separation of powers requires no less and it is a fundamental 
aspect of our constitutional arrangements. 
The ‘unmistakeably clear language’ 
Callinan and Heydon JJ were concerned to avoid creating a de facto ‘merits review’ that was not supported by what they described as the 
‘unmistakeably clear language of the sections’. For this reason they were not willing to infer a balancing test that included competing 
considerations in favour of disclosure. 
It is difficult to appreciate that the language of the legislation is unmistakeably clear in view of the narrow majority, the vehement dissenting 
judgment, and the fact that Hayne J’s reasoning makes it clear that he also accepted the public interest is a multi-faceted concept that requires a 
consideration of all logical arguments, not just those against disclosure. In addition, section 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) 
makes clear, and s 3(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) reinforces, that Commonwealth legislation must be interpreted in a 
manner consistent with the objects for which the law was passed. It is therefore curious that Callinan and Heydon JJ expressly acknowledge that 
their interpretation ‘may’ practically lead to the consequence that one or more of the stated objects of the Act is thereby defeated.  
The language of the section requires the AAT to determine: 
whether there exists reasonable grounds for the claim that the disclosure of the document would be contrary to the public interest. 
Determining whether something is ‘contrary to the public interest’ necessarily requires an interpretation of the term ‘public interest’. The term is 
not defined by the FOI Act. The Australian Senate Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs6 has noted that the meaning of the ‘public 
interest’ is inherently not suitable for precise definition. 
The High Court considered the meaning of the ‘public interest’ in the context of the common law principle of Crown immunity in Sankey v 
Whitlam.7 In that case, Mason J noted that  
In considering an objection to production on the ground of Crown privilege the court must evaluate the respective public interests and determine whether on balance 
the public interest which calls for non-disclosure outweighs the public interest in (favour of disclosure) … In determining this question the court, though it will give 
weight to the Minister’s opinion that the documents should not be produced, is entitled to inspect the documents and form its own conclusion upon the question 
whether the public interest will be better served by production or non-production.
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Stephen J stated that it was ‘the task of a court, in dealing with a claim to Crown privilege, to weigh competing public interests’.9 Sankey v 
Whitlam suggests that the ‘public interest’ is not a static concept, but rather an evaluative judgment that measures and compares a bundle of 
‘competing public interests’ on a case-by-case basis.10 
It is significant that the language of s 58(5) does not limit the AAT to considering the factors that are contrary to the public interest, but rather 
empowers the AAT to review the claim that disclosure of a document is contrary to the public interest. Evaluation of the claim requires 
consideration of the factors both for and against disclosure.  
To employ a balancing test is not the same as conducting a merits review. The AAT does not have the power to override the minister’s discretion 
merely because, upon balancing the factors, it would have come to a different result. It can only determine whether the minister’s evaluation of 
the factors for and against disclosure gives rise to reasonable grounds for issuing the certificate, or whether the evaluation is so flawed that 
reasonable grounds for issuing the certificate do not exist and the minister has acted outside the scope of his discretion. 
Arguably, one analysis of the majority joint judgment is that Callinan and Heydon JJ began with the assumption that they must avoid a merits 
review, and then read down the wording of the relevant sections in view of that assumption. 
Representative government  
and the Constitution 
One argument accepted as reasonable by the majority judges was the Government’s assertion that documents prepared for possible responses by 
ministers in Parliament should remain confidential because their exposure would ‘threaten the Westminster system of government, that is to say 
responsible government’.11 
It is questionable whether disclosure of government information actually threatens responsible government. Our elected representatives will 
always be subject to interrogation and criticism for their decisions. There is no reason to think that providing the public with greater information 
as to the nature and factors involved in their decision-making would increase the quantity of the criticism to the point it would be detrimental to 
responsible government. On the other hand, it might make the criticisms more accurate. 
While responsible government is certainly one important feature of the Westminster system of government, representative government and 
participatory democracy are equally essential. Representative government has been described by Mill as a system where:  
Sovereignty … is vested in the entire aggregate of the community, every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty, but being, 
at least occasionally, called on to take an actual part in the government by the personal discharge of some public function, local or general
12 
The system of representative government contemplated by the Australian Constitution can only work effectively if citizens have a right to 
communicate about political issues. As a result, the High Court has repeatedly confirmed that Australians enjoy an implied constitutional right to 
freedom of communication.13 Mason CJ in the Australian Capital Television case expressed the rationale for the right in these terms: 
Elected representatives have a responsibility not only to ascertain the views of the electorate but also to explain and account for their decisions and actions in 
government and to inform the people so that they may make informed judgments on relevant matters. Absent such a freedom of communication, representative 
government would fail to achieve its purpose,
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Mason CJ concluded that the court should be astute enough not to accept at face value claims by the legislature and executive that freedom of 
communication will, unless curtailed, bring about corruption and distortion of the political process.15 McHugh J in the same case agreed that 
voters had a constitutional right to convey and receive opinions, arguments and information concerning matter likely or intended to affect voting 
in an election.16 This was said to be so that representative and responsible government could operate effectively and as the Constitution intended. 
Brennan J agreed that freedom of political discussion was essential to the democratic process.17 
In Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd, Deane J agreed that  
The freedom of the citizen to examine, discuss and criticise the suitability for office of the elected members of the Parliament and the manner in which they 
discharge their functions and duties as such lies at the very heart of the freedom which the implication of freedom of communication protects.
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The documents sought by the applicant in McKinnon were undoubtedly political in nature. The fact that documents of this nature can be 
exempted from disclosure cripples the public’s ability to analyse the manner in which our elected representatives are discharging their functions 
and duties with respect to key government policies. It stops us from participating fully in our democracy.  
How can we exercise our democratic sovereignty and evaluate whether our representatives are making responsible decisions if we are not 
allowed to see the information and reasoning that forms the basis of those decisions? It would surely be to turn representative government on its 
head to say that the representatives of the people should mandate the information to which the sovereign people have access when informing 
their exercise of sovereign rights.19 
The right to political communication has not been expressed by the High Court as a right to access information, but rather a right to disseminate 
it. Nevertheless, the rationale for reading the right into the Constitution is, as a matter of logic, equally applicable to determining the public 
interest in accessing political documents. 
In Re Eccleston, the Queensland Information Commissioner noted that the enhancement of public participation in government was not an 
explicit purpose of the FOI law, but was implicit in some of its concepts. This point has also been made by other tribunals,20 government 
ministers introducing FOI laws in some states,21 and academics.22 In a 1994 FOI matter, Owen J from the Supreme Court of Western Australia 
stated: 
The implied (right to freedom of expression) was a manifestation of the concept of representative democracy and the rationale upon which it rested was a 




It is questionable whether the High Court would go so far as to find that the Constitution contains an implied r ight to access government 
information.24 However, the constitutional implications of withholding information ought to be considered when construing the test for 
establishing ‘reasonable grounds’ on which an exemption certificate is based. They lend greater  weight to the objectives of the FOI Act, and 
to factors which favour the public’s right to access political information. 
Conclusion 
The majority joint judgment in McKinnon gives an unduly narrow scope to the federal Freedom of Information Act. It allows ministers to 
avoid compliance with the Act by merely issuing a certificate that the disclosure of the material would be contrary to the pu blic interest. The 
judgment is an unwarranted reading down of the review powers provided by the legislation, making FOI  legislation an easy accountability 
mechanism to circumvent. In the absence of clear language limiting the determination of the public interest to consideration of ‘factors 
contrary to disclosure’, factors both for and against disclosure should be considered. The Constitution and its principles of representative 
government require no less. 
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